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Abstract 
This article reconstructs Kant’s thought on early human development and its effect throughout one’s life 
in his empirical, anthropological work. To do so, I examine Kant’s treatment of three aspects of the 
early human development chronologically. Kant’s argument concerns processes that one goes through 
before becoming an adult, which take place beyond one’s control, which form the basis for one’s adult 
self, and which affect one throughout one’s life. One’s experience of these three aspects can be called 
the experience of passivity. First, while an infant, one is subject to the drive and inability to coordinate 
and control one’s bodily motion, to the drive to communicate, and to the activity of imitation. Second, 
one is compelled to begin reasoning rather than actively beginning the exercise of reason. The initial 
activity of reason suddenly has already taken place in one beyond one’s control in such a way that one 
cannot choose whether to begin to exercise the faculty of reason in the first place. Third, one is affected 
by otherness in the formation and development of one’s self. Kant’s thought thus reconstructed proves 
to be consistent with what recent empirical research demonstrates. The present analysis ends with 
questions and implications for social science research. 
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1. Introduction 
This article reconstructs Kant’s thought on early human development and its effect throughout one’s 
life in his empirical, anthropological work (Kant, 2006, 2007). To do so, I examine Kant’s treatment of 
three aspects of the early human development chronologically. First, while an infant, one is subject to 
the drive and inability to coordinate and control one’s bodily motion, to the drive to communicate, and 
to the activity of imitation. Second, one is struck by the initial activity of reason rather than actively 
beginning the exercise of reason. The initial activity of reason suddenly has already taken place in one 
beyond one’s control in such a way that one cannot choose whether to begin to exercise the faculty of 
reason in the first place. Third, one is affected by otherness in the formation and development of one’s 
self. Kant’s thought thus reconstructed proves to be consistent with what recent empirical research 
demonstrates.  
Kant’s argument examined here concerns processes that one goes through before becoming an adult, 
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which take place beyond one’s control, which form the basis for one’s adult self, and which affect one 
throughout one’s life. I will call one’s experience of the three aspects mentioned above the experience 
of passivity.1 I do not deal with Kant’s work where an adult human being is discussed or presupposed. 
For instance, while in many places Kant takes up the issue that as adults we find ourselves subject to 
drives, desires, inclinations, and so on, I do not treat this issue as such. Nor do I discuss Kant’s critical, 
transcendental philosophy including his practical philosophy, where a human being capable of full 
language, judgment, reason, and moral law, namely, an adult person, is presupposed. When this article 
examines Kant’s discussion on an adult human being, it does so in terms of how his/her self is affected 
by his/her early developmental process. 
The present analysis opens up questions such as: given the inescapable fact of passivity, in which sense 
and to what extent can we be said to be a rational, free-acting being? How do we come to terms with 
passivity if we are to understand ourselves primarily as such a being? I conclude with questions like 
these and implications that they have for social science research, our self-understanding, Kant 
scholarship, and non-Kantian naturalistic ethics. 
 
2. Reconstruction 
2.1 First Aspect 
According to Kant, infants are subject to two drives that he argues are innate in them. Kant observes 
that the initial condition of the infant is that he or she is both driven to and unable to coordinate and 
control his or her bodily motion. Kant describes this condition as infants’ “drive [Trieb]” and 
“inability” to use their limbs, to change their bodily positions, and to approach objects (Kant, 2006, p. 
168, p. 232). This is the first drive to which infants are subject. Kant also finds in the “smallest” or 
“newborn” child the “drive to communicate [Der Trieb sich mitzutheilen]” which impels him/her to 
“announce his [/her] existence” to others (Kant, 2006, p. 232; Kant, 2007, p. 164; emphasis in original). 
This is the second drive to which infants are subject. Kant thinks that the second drive persists and 
affects one throughout one’s life (Kant, 2006, pp. 168-169; Kant, 2007, p. 164). 
Infants are unable to experience the initial condition of their existence as it is. Instead, they feel that 
their “freedom” in their drive to coordinate and control their bodily motion is “hindered”. They thereby 
feel an “obscure” sense of “freedom”, “offense”, “affront”, “injustice”, and “justice” (Kant, 2006, p. 
168, p. 232; also Kant, 2007, p. 164). Though indeterminate, these are normative ideas. This means that 
                                                 
1  I do not use the term receptivity. In Kant’s work receptivity (Receptivität) is coupled with 
spontaneity. Being the two sources of knowledge for the human being, both concern presentations of 
objects. Receptivity refers to the way in which the mind is affected by objects and can receive 
presentations thereof. Spontaneity generates presentations of objects and makes possible the generation 
of knowledge. The term receptivity does not capture the characteristics of the experience of the three 
aspects analyzed in this article. 
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infants feel an obscure sense that they should be or become capable of coordinating and controlling 
their bodily motion. Kant states that infants feel that their “freedom” is “taken away” from them by 
something external (Kant, 2006, p. 232). Infants also feel their “inability” as a “constraint” or “fetter” 
(Kant, 2006, p. 168, p. 232; emphasis in original). Infants feel such hindrance, offense, constraint, and 
fetter as something coming from outside. As a matter of fact, however, nothing external, in general, 
hinders, offends, and constrains their drive to coordinate and control their bodily motion. This means 
that infants create an illusory or imaginary cause of the inability at issue and project it onto the outside. 
The drive to communicate that impels one to announce one’s existence to others is involved here. 
Infants feel an obscure normative sense of offense, freedom, justice, injustice, and so on concerning the 
way in which they exist. Infants feel such a sense in relation to others. Such a sense implies that others 
should do justice to infants, remove offense from them, and so on, because infants cannot do so by 
themselves. When feeling such an obscure sense, infants must learn how to communicate it to others 
because the drive to communicate impels infants to, but does not determine exactly how to, 
communicate their existence to others. Through their behavior and gesture (e.g., crying), infants 
express such a sense in the form of a not-yet-articulated “claim [Anspruch]” to justice and freedom that 
they feel is constrained and hindered (Kant, 2006, p. 168, p. 232). This claim is addressed to others.  
Due to the two drives, infants thus come to have an obscure sense of freedom, justice, affront, cause, 
effect, claim, and so on. This, Kant thinks, means that the two drives contribute to the emergence of 
reason’s nascent activity. Kant expresses this thought when he states, without explaining, that the 
obscure ideas infants have of offense, freedom, justice, and injustice “point to [hindeuten] reason” in 
them (Kant, 2006, p. 16). That infants come to have these ideas is an anticipatory sign of the activity of 
reason in them. Presumably, Kant makes this statement for two reasons. First, the concepts of freedom, 
injustice, and justice are moral concepts, and for Kant these are concepts of reason. “Claim” is also a 
normative idea. Kant finds a nascent activity of reason in a not-yet-articulated moral “claim” to 
“freedom” and “justice”. Second, here Kant is probably considering the mind as reason in a broad sense. 
As noted, feeling the inability in question as an effect, infants project its illusory or imaginary cause 
onto the outside. Moreover, infants’ feeling of obscure ideas under consideration is accompanied and 
motivated by other related feelings such as “uncomfortableness”, “annoyance”, “indignation”, and 
“exasperation” (Kant, 2006, p. 16, p. 168, p. 232). Here we can see a nascent activity of the mind (of 
cause-and-effect association, illusion-creating, imagination, projection, claim-making, feeling, and 
emotion), although it is not that infants are consciously doing this but that this takes place in them.2 
                                                 
2 Elsewhere too Kant in effect treats reason as the mind. For example, in many places in the Critique of 
Pure Reason we find Kant saying that reason has, and is impelled by, its needs, interests, satisfactions, 
dissatisfactions, strivings, aspirations, ardors, affections, claims, pretenses, illusions, and so on. In places 
like these Kant should be understood as describing the activity of the mind rather than that of reason in a 
narrow sense, whether it is the faculty of choice, of inference, of morality, or of account-giving.  
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The two drives thus contribute to the emergence of reason’s nascent activity. Here Kant reminds us that 
the mind is embodied. This is to say that its activity is inseparable from and based on our sensorimotor 
capacities, bodily experiences, and feelings accompanied by such experiences. 
In the Anthropology, a piece of work that concerns human facts, Kant finds the drive to communicate in 
the “smallest” or “newborn” child (Kant, 2006, p. 232). Both the cry of infants and their indeterminate 
“claim” to freedom and justice are considered an expression of this drive (Kant, 2006, p. 168, p. 232). 
Kant treats the drive at issue also in his essay entitled “On a Conjectural Beginning of Human History”. 
Kant writes: 
The drive to communicate [Der Trieb sich mitzutheilen] must have been what first moved him [the first 
human being], even when he was still alone, to make his existence known toward living beings outside 
him, especially to those who utter a sound, which he could imitate and afterward use as a name. One sees 
a similar effect of this drive also in children… They want to make their existence known far and wide 
(Kant, 2007, p. 164; emphasis in original). 
In this essay Kant tries to offer a conjectural beginning of human history with Genesis of the Bible as a 
guiding thread. In the first sentence Kant is speaking of the “first human being” in Genesis. This first 
human being is assumed to be a “fully formed” adult (Kant, 2007, p. 164). In the next sentence, however, 
Kant says that a “similar effect” of the drive at issue is found in “children”. What Kant says about 
children in this essay is based on observation. In fact, referring to actual human life, Kant stresses that he 
also tries to use human “experience” as a guiding thread as much as possible (Kant, 2007, p. 163). 
Accordingly, with modifications we can read Kant’s argument in this essay as revealing his thought on 
what takes place in the early developmental process of real human beings. 
To modify Kant’s cited remarks on the drive in question, the first human being and non-human creatures 
in Genesis are replaced with a real infant and real humans, respectively. Kant says that the drive to 
communicate must have impelled the first human being to announce his existence. Similarly, this drive 
impels an infant to announce his/her existence. The first human being tries to make his existence known 
to “living beings outside him, especially to those that utter a sound, which he could imitate and afterward 
use as a name”. By these ‘living beings’ Kant means the animals with whom God presented Adam before 
He created Eve as his mate. If we replace these non-human “living beings” with human beings, we get 
Kant’s idea that an infant is impelled by the drive to communicate to announce his/her existence to other 
human beings, above all to those around him/her (see also Kant, 2006, p. 232). A “sound” uttered by 
non-human living beings is replaced with “sounds” that those around an infant utter in speaking to and 
about him/her. 
To elaborate on the modifications, an infant is born surrounded by others who, knowing who he/she is, 
respond to and speak to and about him/her. To anticipate Kant’s view examined in the third section, 
that is why a young child named Karl was able to say of himself that “Karl wants to eat”. He would not 
have been able to say so if others around him had not appropriately and sufficiently responded to him. 
Initially, however, an infant does not know who or what he/she is. Nor can he/she participate in the talk 
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of others to and about him/her, because what he/she hears are mere “sounds” emitted from the mouths 
of others. Connecting the drive to communicate with the activity of imitation, Kant refers to a process 
in which the first human being was able to “imitate” a “sound” and “afterward” use it as a “name”. 
What is implied is that an infant goes through a similar process. An infant responds to “sounds” uttered 
from the mouths of others around him/her by making sounds such as crying, screaming, and so on 
(Kant, 2006, p. 168, p. 232). An infant also responds to such “sounds” by imitating them. In doing so, 
an infant also imitates the facial expressions and movements (tongue protrusion, mouth opening, etc.) 
and accompanied gestures of others. Otherwise an infant would be unable to utter in an appropriate 
manner sounds that he/she would “afterward use” as words, for example as his/her “name”. Through 
imitating movements of others, an infant gradually learns to coordinate and control his/her bodily 
motion. An infant comes to feel that in imitating others he/she is responding to others in a way similar 
to that in which they are responding to one another via “sounds”. An infant comes to feel that these 
“sounds” are more than mere sounds. “Afterward” an infant somehow comes to understand these 
“sounds” as words with meaning and to use some of these words as “names” including his/her name 
(e.g., “Karl”). Kant thus considers the drive to communicate inseparable from the activity of imitation. 
Since the drive in question is an innate one, the activity of imitation is also innate or almost innate. 
Infants have no choice but to imitate “sounds” and others’ movements if they are to survive and 
develop successfully, although the way in which they imitate others varies depending on the context in 
which they are placed with others. To that extent, infants are subject to the activity of imitation. 
Infants are subject to the process described thus far. This is Kant’s reconstructed argument on the first 
aspect of the experience of passivity. It is important to note that the overall picture Kant offers is 
consistent with what empirical research shows. As infants’ hands, arms, and legs are initially 
unresponsive to their commands (Thelen & Smith, 1996), that is, as they are unable to coordinate and 
control their bodily motion, they must somehow learn to do so. As Clark (2008) says, “the human 
infant must learn (by self-exploration) which neural commands bring about which bodily effects and 
must then practice until skilled enough to issue those commands without conscious effort… and until 
the infant body becomes transparent equipment” (pp. 34-35). Empirical research indicates the existence 
in infants of an “innate or instinctive motive for communication” and of “an inborn ability to 
communicate” (Legerstee, 1999, p. 220). This, however, does not guarantee the success of 
communication. Thus Gibson and Pick (2000) argue that infants must master not only the task of 
coordinating and controlling their bodily motion but also the task of communicating with those around 
them if they are to develop successfully. Inseparable from the drive to communicate, the activity of 
imitation plays a crucial role in mastering these two tasks. “Imitation” in infants is an inborn “social 
mechanism intended to promote interpersonal communication” (Legerstee, 1999, p. 219). Infants 
innately and automatically respond to human voices, faces, and bodily movements differently than to 
inanimate objects. Infants innately and automatically imitate vocalizations, facial expressions including 
emotional expressions, and movements of others. Infants modify their imitative response in relation to 
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others. This modification is more social than innate in that it is performed in relation to others.3 We 
will return to the topic of imitation at the end of the third section. Based on infant studies, Gopnik 
(2009) argues that the mind of an infant is equipped with an innate mechanism for causal thinking, 
creativity, and imagination so that this mechanism underpins his/her reality and fantasy (pp. 3-46). 
Reviewing empirical research, Johnson (2007) emphasizes the “embodied character of reasoning” and 
of the mind, offering a view on the activity of the mind similar to that of Kant. Johnson (2007) also 
argues, as Kant had suggested before him, that abstract concepts such as “justice” and “freedom” are 
embodied, that is, are grounded in and rely on sensorimotor, bodily, and emotional aspects of 
experiences (p. 31, pp. 103-104, p. 106, p. 157, pp. 176-195). Similarly, Siegel (2012) says that our 
ideas of “freedom” and “justice” have “their origins” in our bodily, sensory, and perceptual experiences 
within interpersonal relationships (p. 223). Thus, Kant’s thought on the first aspect of the experience of 
passivity is supported by empirical research. 
2.2 Second Aspect 
Since an adult is capable of reason while an infant is not yet thus capable, in the human’s 
developmental process there is a moment in which the exercise of reason begins. After discussing the 
“drive to communicate”, Kant turns to the issue of what takes place when one experiences the initial 
activity of reason as the faculty of choosing. Kant’s view is that at such a moment one is struck by the 
initial activity of reason rather than actively beginning the exercise of reason. This is Kant’s thought on 
the second aspect of the experience of passivity. 
Kant argues that in his “first attempt at a free choice” the human being discovers or becomes aware of 
the faculty of reason, or “a faculty of choosing for himself a way of living” (Kant, 2007, p. 166). With 
this operation of reason, there opens up “an infinity of them [objects of desires among which to 
choose]” (ibid.). Here Kant is in effect discussing consciousness in its primary function. As Koch 
(2004) argues, in its primary function, consciousness provides a “compact representation” of “the 
present state of affairs in the world” and “make[s] this terse summary accessible to the planning stages 
[of the brain]”. Consciousness allows actions that are “more flexible” than instinctive, reflex, 
automated, or “stereotyped” behaviors, so that one can deal with those “novel or surprising situations” 
encountered in the world for which such behaviors are inadequate. Consciousness allows one (or the 
relevant “parts of the brain”) to “choose among different plans of action” to “decide a future [and 
optimal] course of action” (Koch, 2004, p. 233, p. 234, p. 235, p. 236, and p. 246).4 It thus turns out 
that, by discussing what takes place when one becomes aware of the faculty of reason as that of 
                                                 
3 For imitation in infants, see Legerstee (1999, p. 217, p. 219), Rochat (2004, pp. 7-8), and Marotos 
(1998, pp. 145-160). 
4 For the function of consciousness, its evolutionary advantage, and its neurological locations in the 
brain, see Koch (2004, pp. 231-247). I do not go into the issue of the definition of consciousness. For 
the difficulty of defining consciousness rigorously, see Koch (2012, pp. 32-34; also 2004, p. 332). 
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choosing, Kant is in effect considering what one experiences when consciousness begins to perform its 
primary function. With this in mind, let’s examine Kant’s thought. 
We live constantly choosing among various things in our everyday lives. Thereby our lives become 
enriched. We feel afraid that we would have a poor way of life without the faculty of choosing. 
Accordingly, we may be tempted to think that the human being, when faced with the operation of 
reason for the first time, would have felt excited about the infinite possibilities that opened up for 
his/her way of living. That, however, is not Kant’s view. While not sure whether a human being felt 
“delight” at the moment he/she makes the first attempt at a free choice, Kant is convinced that he/she 
must have been struck by “anxiety and fright” at that moment (Kant, 2007, p. 166). Kant regards the 
activity of reason as accompanied by the feelings of anxiety and fright, as well as by those of 
uncomfortableness, annoyance, indignation, and exasperation. 
Kant links “anxiety” with the initial activity of reason. Fear is called “anxiety” when it is unknown 
what kind of threat the object of fear will bring about and/or when it is unclear which particular object 
that fear is a fear of (Kant, 2006, p. 153). The situation under consideration is not that in which there 
are too many options to choose from. Nor is it that in which a person is solely and entirely held 
responsible for whatever consequences may result from his/her choice. While these two situations too 
would induce anxiety (Salecl, 2010, pp. 14-44), the situation in question is that in which the human 
being is faced with the act of choosing as such in the first place. Kant explicitly says that the human 
being must have felt “anxiety and fright concerning… how he should deal with this newly discovered 
faculty [of choosing for himself/herself a way of living, that is, the faculty of reason]” (Kant, 2007, p. 
166). The human being is confronted with choosing as such without knowing what it would be or mean 
to choose and what choosing as such would bring about in the first place. That is why Kant says that 
the initial activity of reason is accompanied by anxiety. 
Kant links “fright” with the initial activity of reason. This is because that activity suddenly has already 
taken place in us beyond our control in such a way that we cannot choose whether to begin to exercise 
the faculty of choosing in the first place. As the faculty of choosing begins to operate there opens up an 
“infinity” of objects among which to choose. Before reason begins to operate, choice as such does not 
exist in the first place. Here “instinct” directs one to this or that object (Kant, 2007, p. 166). Somehow 
the move takes place from the condition in which choice as such does not exist to the condition in 
which choice exists and in which one has to exercise the faculty of choosing constantly. Let us call the 
latter condition (which is the condition of our everyday life) the practice of choice. We cannot choose 
whether to make this move to begin with. We cannot choose whether to begin the practice of choice in 
the first place. Whether to make this move, whether to begin the practice of choice in the first place, is 
not itself a matter of choice. If this were an object of choice, it would mean that one chooses whether to 
make the move and that one chooses whether to begin the practice of choice. This means that the move 
has somehow already taken place and the practice of choice has already begun. Whether to make this 
move, this choice, is not itself an object of choice. The same situation just appears at a higher level, ad 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr             World Journal of Social Science Research                 Vol. 2, No. 2, 2015 
207 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
infinitum. Thus, it is not an object of choice whether to make the move to begin with or whether to start 
the practice of choice in the first place. It is not that we happen to be unable to choose whether to make 
the move or whether to begin the practice of choice in the first place. It is that we cannot choose this. 
And yet we are engaged in the practice of choice. It then must be the case that the move or the practice 
of choice somehow suddenly has already taken place and hit the human being beyond his/her control. 
Such an abrupt stroke must have caused a sudden affect in the human being and disturbed his/her mind. 
That is why Kant thinks that the initial activity of reason is accompanied by “fright”, which is a 
“suddenly aroused fear that disconcerts the mind” (Kant, 2006, p. 153).  
Just as we cannot choose whether to begin the practice of choice in the first place, so we cannot choose 
whether to end it. Kant states that the human being cannot choose to return to the state in which choice 
did not exist as such (Kant, 2007, p. 166). Not to choose at all for the rest of life does not end the 
practice of choice, because this amounts to continuously choosing not to choose and thus the practice 
of choice continues. (I leave aside the case of a suicide as a way to end the practice of choice.) The 
move to the practice of choice, once it has taken place, is irreversible although one cannot choose 
whether to make the move. The human being is struck by the activity of reason so that he/she finds 
himself/herself already involved in the practice of choice without being able to choose whether to start 
it or whether to end it. 
We find Kant’s surprising notion of the exercise of reason when we look at his remarks on anxiety, 
fright, and affect. According to Kant, both anxiety and fright belong to affect (Kant, 2006, p. 153). 
Before and after his discussion of anxiety and fright, Kant repeatedly connects affect with mental 
illness. Kant says that a person seized by affect is “probably always” suffering an “illness of the mind” 
(Kant, 2006, p. 149; emphasis in original). Such a person “resembles a deranged person” (Kant, 2006, p. 
151). “Affects are generally diseased occurrences (symptoms)” (Kant, 2006, p. 154). As his words 
“probably always”, “resemble”, and “generally” indicate, Kant thinks that, when going through the 
initial activity of reason accompanied by the affects of anxiety and fright, one experiences a state 
identical, or if not identical, then very similar, to mental illness or derangement. 
We also find Kant’s equally unusual view of the activity of reason when we look at his figurative 
description of it. Kant depicts metaphorically the situation in which the human being was initially faced 
with the faculty of reason as that in which “he stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss [Abgrund]” 
(Kant, 2007, p. 166). This “abyss” passage comes immediately after the passage on how to deal with 
the faculty of choice (reason) as such that suddenly emerged accompanied by anxiety and fright. The 
moment one discovers or becomes aware of the faculty of reason is likened to the moment one 
discovers an abyss and finds oneself standing on its brink. If he were to use figurative language, Kant 
could have compared the beginning of reason’s activity with the emergence, discovery, or 
establishment of a ground because he discusses reason of an adult human being using the term ground 
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(Grund) (Caygill, 1995, pp. 217-219).5 The fact is, however, that Kant resorts to the image of an abyss. 
The “abyss” passage, where Kant refers to an “infinity” of objects of choice, is immediately followed 
by the passage where Kant argues that, once one begins the practice of choice, one cannot return to the 
situation in which choice as such did not exist. These three passages are successive with the “abyss” 
passage being located in the middle. An abyss is a bottomless gulf. Accordingly, the bottomlessness of 
an abyss is meant to represent the infinite regress concerning the beginning of the practice of choice, 
the infinity of objects among which to choose, and the impossibility of getting out of the practice of 
choice. As we have seen, according to Kant, one finds oneself already involved passively in the activity 
of reason and struck by anxiety and fright, rather than actively choosing to begin the exercise of reason. 
In Kant’s metaphorical language, the moment one becomes aware of the faculty of reason corresponds 
to the moment one discovers an abyss and finds oneself standing on its brink. Then, beginning to use 
reason turns out to be similar to being engulfed by and into, rather than to actively entering, an abyss 
that suddenly appears and which produces anxiety and fright in us. Exercising the faculty of reason 
without being able to end the practice of choice turns out to be analogous to being stuck in an abyss 
rather than to actively choosing to stay in it. 
The words “anxiety”, “fright”, and “abyss” are meant together to characterize our experience of the 
initial activity of reason. Kant likens using reason in our everyday lives (the practice of choice) to being 
stuck in an abyss. If using reason in everyday life requires a sound mind, the expression of being stuck 
in an abyss seems to be an inappropriate figurative depiction for a sound mind. This expression, if it is 
to depict either a sound mind or a diseased mind, appears to be an appropriate metaphorical depiction 
for the latter. This is especially so when affect, to which anxiety and fright belong, is related to mental 
illness. To be sure, we may not feel anxiety and fright that accompanied the initial activity of reason 
any more. If we do not, and yet if anxiety, fright, and abyss are intended together to characterize the 
exercise of reason, does this mean that we are no longer stuck in the abyss? That is not what Kant 
suggests. Clearly, Kant suggests that we are stuck in an abyss because we constantly exercise the 
faculty of reason and are engaged in the practice of choice. Then, if we no longer feel anxiety and fright, 
that would be because we either have got used to or have forgotten the fact that we are in fact stuck in 
an abyss. In either case, we would continue to feel uneasy about the depiction of using reason in our 
everyday lives as being stuck in an abyss. Certainly, it would be too much to say that Kant is saying 
that we in fact are all deranged and mentally ill. Still, if we feel uneasy, that would be because here 
Kant is suggesting that the line between exercising the faculty of reason and suffering an illness of the 
                                                 
5 In the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says that the concept of freedom is the 
“keystone” of the whole structure of reason, and alone keeps it from falling into “an abyss of 
skepticism [einen Abgrund des Skeptizismus]” (Kant, 1996, p. 139). As I argued elsewhere, Kant also 
resorts to the image of an abyss when he describes how reason cancels itself through its operation (Saji, 
2006). 
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mind or that between a sound mind and a diseased mind would be thinner and less certain than we may 
wish to believe. Indeed, as I argued elsewhere, in the Anthropology Kant undermines the division 
between reason and unreason (Saji, 2009a). At any rate, one is struck by the initial activity of reason. 
This experience is of such nature that it is to be characterized by the words “anxiety”, “fright”, and 
“abyss”. This is Kant’s view on the second aspect of the experience of passivity. 
2.3 Third Aspect 
Kant’s thought on the third aspect of the experience of passivity concerns how one’s self and one’s 
sense thereof are formed and developed. Kant expresses his thought on this theme when he writes in a 
section entitled “On consciousness of oneself” in the Anthropology: 
It is noteworthy that the child who can already speak fairly fluently nevertheless first begins to talk by 
means of “I” fairly late (perhaps a year later); in the meantime speaking of himself in the third person 
(Karl wants to eat, to walk, etc.). When he starts to speak by means of “I” a light seems to dawn on him, 
as it were, and from that day on he never again returns to his former way of speaking—Before he 
merely felt himself; now he thinks himself—The explanation of this phenomenon might be rather 
difficult for the anthropologist (Kant, 2006, p. 15; emphasis in original). 
I will spell out Kant’s view on the third aspect by explicating this passage. 
Here Kant is dealing with the empirical developmental process through which young children come to 
begin to use the first-person pronouns in their self-reference and self-description. Two dimensions of 
consciousness of oneself are at issue. The first dimension is consciousness of oneself that one has when 
one speaks of oneself in the third person without being able to speak using first-person singular 
pronouns. The second dimension is consciousness of oneself that one acquires after one has spoken in 
the first person “I”. One goes through a developmental process from the stage where the first 
dimension exists to that where the second emerges. Kant focuses on what takes place in this process. 
Kant’s view is that the self is formed in this process by otherness in such a way that this otherness 
cannot be coherently integrated into the second dimension of consciousness of oneself. What Kant’s 
idea implies is that one’s self develops on the basis of this otherness and that one is affected throughout 
one’s life by this otherness in the formation and development of one’s self. 
A young child first speaks of himself/herself in the third-person and later begins to use the first person 
“I” in his/her self-reference and self-description. Kant sees this fact as crucial for considering how 
consciousness of oneself develops. Recognizing the importance of this fact, empirical researchers show 
that it is not until around four years that the majority of children stop giving a third-person account of 
themselves and use consistently first-person singular pronouns for their self-reference and 
self-description (Rochat, 2004; Lewis, 2003). 
Of the transition from the use of the third person to that of the first-person pronoun “I”, Kant says that 
“before he [a young child] merely felt himself; now he thinks himself”. By saying “now he thinks 
himself” Kant means that this child thinks himself/herself when referring to and describing 
himself/herself in the first-person singular pronouns. The consciousness of oneself to which Kant refers 
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here is consciousness of oneself as oneself. Capable of using the first-person singular pronouns “I”, 
“my”, “me”, “mine”, and “myself” to refer to oneself, one can conceive of oneself as oneself. In this 
self-awareness, one can also be conscious of oneself as “one and the same person” to which “all 
changes”, namely, different experiences, are ascribed to oneself as one’s own (Kant, 2006, p. 15). 
Kant’s view is consistent with what empirical research shows. Based on recent infant studies, Lewis 
argues that the start of the use of first person pronouns in children reflects or shows the emergence in 
these children of the “idea of me”, “self-representation”, or “meta-representation” (that is, 
consciousness of oneself as oneself) (Lewis, 2003, pp. 281-282; emphasis in original).  
Kant says that “before [that is, before speaking in the first-person singular pronouns] he [a young child] 
merely felt himself”. By saying “he merely felt himself” Kant does not mean to claim that this child 
who could not think at all through language. Karl has mastered the use of concepts of “want”, “eat”, 
“walk”, and more. as well as the use of the third person pronoun “Karl”. To that extent, Karl at this 
stage is able to think. However, Karl cannot think of himself as “me” or “myself” because he has not 
mastered the use of the first-person singular pronouns. 
Kant gives an example in which a child named Karl gives third-person self-descriptions such as “Karl 
wants to eat, to walk, etc”. By this time Karl has experienced, lived, or lived through, passivity in its 
first and second aspects discussed in the previous two sections. Kant presents two ideas in this example. 
First, for Karl, how others see Karl precedes how he sees himself. Second, Karl’s expressive behavior 
(the outer self) precedes the identification of his supposedly corresponding mental state (the inner self). 
The example of Karl is meant to describe what takes place in one’s early developmental process. 
Together these two ideas show that before speaking of oneself by means of “I” one initially appears to 
oneself as an other for others without having the “idea of me” and without being able to conceive of 
oneself as oneself.  
The words “Karl”, “want”, “eat”, and “walk” and the meaning thereof are not Karl’s creation. Initially, 
these words are just sounds to Karl. As indicated in our earlier discussion of the topic of imitation, Karl 
has no choice but to learn these sounds by imitating others who utter these sounds, especially others 
around him such as his “mother and nurse” (Kant, 2006, p. 16). “Karl” is the name others use when 
they call and describe this child as an other for them. “Karl wants to do this or that” is originally a 
statement that others make about Karl when they speak to and about him as an other for them. Karl 
somehow comes to understand these sounds as words that have meanings. The child comes to refer to 
himself as Karl and gives third-person self-descriptions. This means that, without being able to give 
first-person self-reference and self-description, Karl has internalized the perspective in which others 
see him as an other for them.  
What is puzzling is how Karl has come to take such a perspective concerning the verb “want”. The 
expression “Karl wants to eat” describes a mental state (feeling a desire for food). What Kant implies is 
that there is a certain period of time in the early developmental process of Karl when others know and 
identify which mental state of Karl is to be differentiated and named as such and such whereas Karl 
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does not. Others cannot directly gain access to Karl’s mental states. The items available to others are 
Karl’s behavior and the situation in which it is embedded. Since Kant regards the cry of an infant as an 
important way for him/her to communicate, and an expression of the drive to communicate (Kant, 2006, 
p. 168, p. 232), let us consider situations in which Karl cries.  
Suppose Karl starts crying when he has not had milk for a while. Seeing Karl’s cry as an expression of 
his hunger, that is, his desire for food, others speak to and about him saying “Karl is hungry and wants 
to eat”. They give milk to him, and Karl stops crying. Suppose Karl starts crying after having been in a 
baby car seat for a while. Understanding Karl’s cry as an expression of his desire to walk, others speak 
to and about him saying “Karl wants to walk”. They get him out of the baby car seat and let him try to 
walk. Karl stops crying. Suppose Karl starts crying when he hits his head hard on the floor. Regarding 
Karl’s cry as an expression of his pain, others soothe him bodily and verbally. Suppose Karl, having 
had to keep awake for a while, starts crying. Seeing his cry as an expression of his desire for sleep, 
others speak to and about him saying “Karl is sleepy and wants to sleep”. They let him sleep. When 
others misperceive and respond to Karl’s cry in an inappropriate manner, Karl continues to cry. He may 
cry harder and louder. Others then adjust their understanding and response. Through these and similar 
processes, others appropriately differentiate, identify, describe, and respond to Karl’s cry and his 
supposedly corresponding mental states while they also speak to and about him. It is through others 
that Karl becomes able to differentiate his mental states and behaviors. Karl used to just cry. Now he 
can express his mental states by saying “Karl wants to eat, to walk, to sleep, is hungry, in pain, sleepy, 
etc”. The same would hold for the process in which Karl learns other words that describe his mental 
states in the third person.  
Certainly, Karl learns through these various situations what it is like to experience this or that mental 
state. But Karl learns which mental state is to be differentiated as this or that only through copying and 
internalizing others’ identifications and descriptions of his mental state of which his behavior is 
supposedly expressive. Kant’s view is in line with what infant studies show. Initially unable to gain 
access introspectively to their own differential basic emotional states and mental states, infants 
gradually become capable of doing so through parental or primary caregiver’s feedback (Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002).6 This indicates that if an infant did not receive appropriate and 
sufficient responses from others in his/her early developmental process, later he/she would have 
problems with his/her mental states. We will return to this topic. 
When drawing attention to the fact that there can be no “dissimulation” present in an infant (Kant, 2006, 
p. 16), Kant also recognizes the fact that for a certain period of time others know and identify which 
mental state an infant is in while the infant does not. Once one knows the connection between one’s 
mental state and one’s behavior supposedly expressive of it, one can dissimulate one’s mental state by 
                                                 
6 Especially (pp. 145-222), where the authors offer an extensive review of the empirical research on 
this topic. 
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manipulating that connection. Dissimulation is absent in an infant because such a connection is 
unknown to him/her. Here others alone can know and identify the connection while he/she cannot. 
Kant’s view is confirmed by empirical research, which shows that the first-person singular pronoun use 
precedes dissimulation, pretense, or pretend play. Dissimulation, pretense, or pretend play represents an 
“early manifestation of the ability to understand mental states including one’s own” and to know them 
as an “object of knowledge” (Lewis, 2003, pp. 282-284). The toddler gradually becomes capable of 
concealing his/her inner world (desires, intentions, etc.) around 48 months of age (The Boston Change 
Process Study Group, 2010, p. 61). As one begins at around the age of four to use consistently the 
first-person singular pronouns to refer to and describe oneself, one becomes able to know and 
dissimulate one’s own mental states as “my” mental states.  
Thus, the outer self precedes the inner self in the process in which one comes to learn how to refer to 
and describe one’s mental states in the third person. Others’ descriptions of one as an other for them 
precede and make possible one’s self-reference and self-description in the third person. Through 
copying and internalizing such descriptions by others, one identifies oneself with an other for others 
and refers to and describes oneself in the third person. As one begins to use consistently the first-person 
singular pronouns in one’s self-reference and self-description, one takes over this other for others as 
one’s self (“I”) and comes to have the “idea of me” (consciousness of oneself as oneself). From this 
point forward, one’s self grows on the basis of such identification and taking-over.  
What takes place inside Karl in the transition from the use of the third person to that of the first-person 
singular pronouns in his self-reference and self-description? Kant expresses his view on this issue when 
he states that “when he [Karl] starts to speak by means of “I” a light seems to dawn on him, as it were, 
and from that day on he never again returns to his former way of speaking”. I argue that here Kant is 
referring to what may be called the unconscious. Kant thinks that what takes place in the transition 
under consideration is that one’s memory of oneself prior to one’s use of “I” is kept out of 
consciousness of oneself as oneself because it cannot be coherently integrated into that consciousness. 
In this sense, Karl’s memory of himself before his consistent use of the first-person pronouns remains 
unconscious for him. I spell out this thought of Kant’s by examining what he means by the metaphor of 
“light” in connection with the use of the first-person singular pronoun and by the expression of “he 
never again returns to his former way of speaking [in the third person]”. 
When describing Karl’s mental life with the metaphor of light, Kant must have in mind something that 
is to be depicted by the metaphor of darkness or shade because the former metaphor makes sense in 
contrast to the latter. This something is Karl’s mental life before he speaks by means of “I”. I advance 
this supposition because Kant makes the link between the metaphor of light and the use of the 
first-person pronoun “I” and because he thereby implies a contrast with Karl’s state before and after 
that use. Since one’s using the first-person singular pronouns concurs with one’s having consciousness 
of oneself as oneself, “light” is meant to depict consciousness of oneself as oneself. Accordingly, 
“darkness” or “shade” should be meant to indicate something of which one is unaware in consciousness 
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of oneself as oneself. This something may be called the unconscious in relation to that consciousness. 
Indeed, a little later Kant describes consciousness and the unconscious in general through the 
metaphors of light and darkness or shade. The mind is, as it were, a vast map, and consciousness is just 
a small, “illuminated” part of it (emphasis in original). Consciousness is depicted as the field of “light” 
or the area where “rays of light” are cast. The rest of the mind, where there are countless 
representations of which we are not conscious, exists “in the shade” or “in the dark” (Kant, 2006, pp. 
24-25).7 
It does not follow from the above that the unconscious in question, that is, something of which one is 
unconscious in consciousness of oneself as oneself, cannot be brought to that consciousness. Kant’s 
statement that “he never again returns to his former way of speaking [in the third person]” (emphasis 
added) shows, however, that Kant is pointing to what cannot be integrated into consciousness of 
oneself as oneself. 
We should think that by “never again” Kant means something different from an everyday fact that 
usually those who speak in the first person no longer speak of themselves in the third person. This is 
because as a matter of fact they can speak of themselves in the third person if they want to. We should 
understand Kant as saying that even if these people speak again of themselves in the third person, they 
cannot be said to be returning to their former way of speaking in the third person. Let us call Karl who 
spoke of himself in the third person without speaking by means of “I” the third-person Karl, and Karl 
who speaks by means of “I” the first-person Karl. Kant’s view is that episodes experienced by the 
third-person Karl cannot be integrated into the first-person Karl’s consciousness as “my” episodes, as 
episodes experienced by “me”. To generalize, the unconscious in question cannot be integrated into 
consciousness of oneself as oneself because one cannot gain access, as “my” memory, to the memory 
of the time before one becomes able to speak in the first person. That is why Kant says “never again”. 
What is at issue is Karl’s memory. Certainly, the problem of memory does not appear in the paragraph 
in which the “never again” sentence occurs. In the next paragraph, however, Kant says that the period 
of childhood he is discussing is not yet the period of “experience [Erfahrung; emphasis in original]” 
(Kant, 2006, p. 16). Then in the next paragraph Kant discusses the problem of “memory [Erinnerung]” 
of the period of “childhood” to which one cannot “reach back”. Kant says that one cannot gain access 
to the memory of this period of childhood because it is “not the time of experiences [Erfahrungen]” 
(ibid.). What is at issue in these three paragraphs are the mode of experience of a very young child like 
Karl and the problem of memory of childhood. 
The concept of memory entails that the subject who recalls something (an object, person, or event) and 
the subject who experienced the remembered thing are one and the same person. Kant argues that the 
“faculty of memory [Erinnerungsvermögen]” is based upon the “association of representations of the 
past…consciousness of the subject with the present” (Kant, 2006, p. 75). The faculty of memory serves 
                                                 
7 I discussed Kant’s view on the unconscious in Saji (2009b, pp. 316-321). 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr             World Journal of Social Science Research                 Vol. 2, No. 2, 2015 
214 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
to “connect in a coherent experience [Erfahrung] what no longer exists… with what presently exists” 
(ibid.; emphasis in original). Recall Kant’s statement that by means of “I” one has consciousness of 
oneself as “one and the same person” to whom different experiences are ascribed to oneself as one’s 
own (Kant, 2006, p. 15). One’s remembering something is remembering it as that which one once 
experienced. One’s recalling something is recalling it as one’s past experience. Memory has to take the 
form in which “one is conscious of one’s ideas as those which would be encountered in one’s past” 
(Kant, 2006, p. 75). This is what it means for one to remember something. (This does not imply that the 
memory of autobiographical events and past personal experiences is infallible.) The problem with the 
case of Karl is that the way in which the first-person Karl tries to remember the episodes experienced 
by the third-person Karl is incompatible with the form of memory thus understood. The first-person 
Karl cannot “connect in a coherent experience” episodes experienced by the third-person Karl with the 
first-person Karl’s life. 
When the third-person Karl speaks of himself, he cannot think “I am speaking of myself in the third 
person”. The third-person Karl cannot describe his episodes as episodes experienced by “me”. Suppose 
the first-person Karl tries to recall the episodes experienced by the third-person Karl. The first-person 
Karl cannot recall them as “my” episodes. It is not “I” who once experienced them. The first-person 
Karl cannot have and remember the memory of them as “my” memory. It was the memory of the 
third-person Karl without his being “I”. If the first-person Karl were to recall episodes experienced by 
the third-person Karl, the form in which the first-person Karl does so would have to be something like 
this: “I am recalling episodes once experienced by the third-person Karl without his being ‘me’”. A 
person, however, cannot remember and recall as his own experience something that was not 
experienced by “me”.  
If the first-person Karl is to “connect in a coherent experience” episodes experienced by the 
third-person Karl with those experienced by the first-person Karl, these two species of episodes must 
be organized as episodes experienced by “me”. Otherwise the first-person Karl cannot “connect in a 
coherent experience” these two species of episodes. However, if by connecting the two species of 
episodes “in a coherent experience” the first-person Karl recalls episodes experienced by the 
third-person Karl as episodes once experienced by “me”, this amounts to distorting the nature of the 
episodes experienced by the third-person Karl.8 If the first-person Karl cannot “connect in a coherent 
experience” the two species of episodes without distorting the nature of one species of episodes, this in 
effect means that the first-person Karl cannot “connect in a coherent experience” the two species of 
episodes.  
To be sure, in the period before his use of the first-person singular pronouns, Karl is not the subject of 
                                                 
8 What is under consideration is linguistic autobiographical memory. The memory of the third-person 
Karl may occur to the first-person Karl’s consciousness in other forms of memory such as perceptual 
and procedural memory. I do not go into this issue. 
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experience (Erfahrung) in that he cannot “connect in a coherent experience [Erfahrung]” episodes as 
“my” episodes. But Karl is the subject of experience (Erlebnis) in that he experiences, lives, or lives 
through, events without being able to connect them in a coherent way. Certainly, the memory of 
episodes lived through by Karl in this period is retained inside him (I leave aside the topic of its exact 
location). These episodes, however, cannot be coherently integrated into the first-person Karl’s “my” 
consciousness (consciousness of oneself as oneself) as episodes experienced by “me”. Karl’s 
experience of these episodes cannot be coherently integrated into the first-person Karl’s life as “my” 
experience. Karl’s memory of these episodes cannot be coherently integrated into the first-person 
Karl’s mind in the form of “my” memory. The first-person Karl cannot recall these episodes as those 
experienced by “me” and cannot access the memory of them as “my” memory. 
There are two more points worth noting about Kant’s remarks on Karl. First, the fact that Kant lets the 
third-person Karl speak only in the present tense (“Karl wants to eat, to walk, etc”.) indicates that Kant 
is aware that the third-person Karl has difficulty integrating his past self into his present self. This has 
to do with the age of the third-person Karl. Recall Kant’s observation that the child first speaks of 
himself/herself in the third person and then “begins to talk by means of “I” fairly late (perhaps a year 
later)”. Since the majority of children begin to use consistently the first-person singular pronouns at the 
age of around four, the third-person Karl is probably less than three years old. Based on empirical 
research, Rochat says: “it is not prior to approximately 3 years that children begin to grasp the temporal 
dimension of the self” (Rochat, 2004, pp. 11-12). Second, since Kant focuses on what it was like for 
Karl to experience the transition from the third-person Karl to the first-person Karl by beginning to 
speak by means of “I”, Kant would have wanted to let the first-person Karl speak in direct discourse: 
“When I started to speak by means of “I” a light seemed to dawn on me, as it were. Before I merely felt 
myself; now I think myself”. Instead, however, Kant gives a third-person description of what it was like 
for Karl to experience the transition at issue. This is because Kant is aware that the first-person Karl 
cannot coherently express this experience (and more generally episodes experienced by the 
third-person Karl) using the first-person singular pronouns. The birth of the first-person Karl is not yet 
an experience (Erfahrung) of the first-person Karl. Nor is it an experience (Erfahrung) of the 
third-person Karl. Certainly the transition took place in Karl, however. This can be said to be an 
experience (Erlebnis) that Karl lived or lived through without being able to locate it coherently in his 
memory. 
This transition is a phenomenon difficult to describe. Kant states that “the explanation of this 
phenomenon [the transition at issue along with the emergence of consciousness of oneself as oneself] 
might be rather difficult for the anthropologist”. Kant is right because this phenomenon still has not 
been fully explained by empirical research. Lewis says: “the critical events that lead to this 
meta-representation [“the idea of me”] have not been fully worked out” (Lewis, 2003, p. 291). Even so, 
Kant’s thought on Karl’s memory explained above is consistent with what empirical research has thus 
far been able to show.  
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The episodes experienced by Karl before his consistent use of the first-person pronouns cannot be 
coherently integrated into the memory of the first-person Karl even though Karl is the subject who 
experienced these episodes. This can be considered an example of infantile amnesia. Infantile amnesia 
refers to the “lack of genuine memories of personally experienced events that occurred prior to about 3 
to 4 years of age” (Fonagy et al., 2002, p. 245). Infantile amnesia occurs because young children before 
this age are unable to “encode personally experienced events as personally experienced” (Perner, 2000, 
p. 306; emphasis in original). Certainly, it is they who experienced these events. They cannot, however, 
integrate these events in a coherent organization as “personally experienced”, that is, as events 
experienced by “me”. One factor for this is that they are not yet capable of using the first-person 
singular pronouns in describing their experiences. Another factor is that these young children have 
difficulty grasping the temporal dimension of their self. Kant is aware of these two factors. Infantile 
amnesia disappears “at around 4 to 5 years of age” when the “autobiographic organization of memories 
as personally experienced events”, that is, as events experienced by “me”, is established (Fonagy et al., 
2002, p. 245).9 Children come to have consistent autobiographical memory at around the age of four as 
they begin to use consistently the first-person pronouns in their self-reference and self-description. 
Kant thinks that one’s experiences before speaking by means of “I” cannot be coherently integrated 
into consciousness of oneself as oneself that one comes to have through consistently using the 
first-person singular pronouns. In terms of the formation of one’s self, one’s experience of otherness in 
its four respects cannot be integrated into consciousness of oneself as oneself. To take the example of 
Karl, first, Karl was initially an other for others (“Karl”) without being “me”. Second, by copying and 
internalizing others’ descriptions of Karl as an other for them, Karl identified himself with the 
Karl-as-an-other-for-others (the third-person Karl). Third, through using consistently the first-person 
singular pronouns in self-reference and self-description, the third-person Karl takes over the 
Karl-as-an-other-for-others as his self (“I”, the first-person Karl). Fourth, it is Karl without being “me” 
who initiated and underwent this process. As we have seen, the move from the situation where 
choosing as such did not exist to that where the practice of choice begins, once it has taken place, is 
irreversible while we cannot choose whether to begin the practice of choice. And the move took place. 
Similarly, as our discussion of Kant’s statement “never again” has shown, the transition from the use of 
the third-person to that of the first-person pronouns, once it has occurred, is irreversible. Here, too, 
since it is not “I” who makes the transition, “I” cannot choose whether to do so. And the transition 
occurred. In both cases, we passively go through an irreversible process. From the transition forward, 
the first-person Karl’s self will develop from the Karl-as-an-other-for-others whom the third-person 
Karl took over as his self (“I”). 
Rochat (2004) describes the difficulty children are confronted with in this process of self-identification 
                                                 
9 For the authors’ review of the relevant research including that on young children’s use of the third 
person and first person in their self-descriptions, see Fonagy et al. (2002, pp. 245-246). 
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as a “Me as an other” or “Me but Not Me” dilemma (pp. 11-12). Lewis (2003) describes the same 
difficulty when he points out that the child’s use of his/her own name [that is, the third person] in 
describing him/her [e.g., “Karl wants to eat”] is “not necessarily reflecting a representation of the self” 
(p. 282). Through the example of Karl, Kant too describes this difficult early developmental process 
that one must go through if one is to become conscious of oneself as oneself, capable of referring to 
and describing oneself in the first-person pronouns, and capable of developing one’s self. Kant’s 
thought is that in the early developmental process consciousness of oneself as oneself is formed by 
otherness in such a way that, while such otherness cannot be coherently integrated into that very 
consciousness, one has no choice but to develop one’s self on the basis of such otherness. 
Such otherness persists and affects one throughout one’s life. Kant is right that the use of the 
first-person singular pronouns is crucial for the development of the self. Based on recent infant studies, 
Lewis (2003) says: “the advent of this capacity [to refer to and describe oneself by means of the 
first-person singular pronouns] is a milestone in the development of human cognition, action, and 
emotional life” (p. 291). Kant’s thought, however, also implies that this later development of one’s self 
(the development of one’s self after one becomes capable of self-reference and self-description in the 
first-person singular pronouns) continues to be affected at its basic level by the otherness under 
consideration.10 
To take the example of Karl, the first-person Karl has no choice but to develop his self from the 
Karl-as-an-other-for-others whom the third-person Karl took over as his self (“I”). The 
Karl-as-an-other-for-others is the only basis on which the development of the first-person Karl’s self is 
                                                 
10 Kant’s thought differs from and adds to Charles H. Cooley’s discussion of the “looking-glass self” 
because “I” is already at work in the looking-glass self. According to Cooley (1902), in order for a self 
to form and develop, it needs three components: “(1) The imagination of our appearance to the other 
person, (2) The imagination of his judgment of that appearance and (3) Some sort of self-feeling-Pride, 
Mortification” (p. 152). What I think others think I am or should be is crucial here. Considering a self 
always a social self, Cooley calls it a “looking-glass self” (p. 152). Cooley says that “by the word “self” 
in this discussion is meant simply that which is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the first 
person singular, “I”, “me”, “my”, “mine”, and “myself” (p. 136). The self in Cooley’s discussion is 
already capable of referring to and describing oneself in the first person singular pronouns. Based upon 
his observations of his children’s behavior, Cooley discusses how they come to use the first person 
singular pronouns (pp. 142-143, pp. 157-162). Cooley, however, does not examine how one’s self in 
Cooley’s sense is formed and affected by one’s experience before being capable of using the first person 
singular pronouns in such a way that this experience cannot be coherently integrated into the 
consciousness of one’s self in Cooley’s sense. Kant examines precisely this problem. Thus, while Kant 
would agree with Cooley that a self is always a social self, Kant’s argument differs from and adds to 
Cooley’s discussion. 
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possible. Presumably, the Karl-as-an-other-for-others sets the basic structure of the first-person Karl’s 
self and constrains the basic pattern of the development of that self. If there are problems with this 
basis, the first-person Karl’s self takes over these problems. Suppose that in his early developmental 
process Karl did not receive appropriate and sufficient feedback about his behaviors and mental states 
from his parents or primary caregivers. Karl would not be able to copy and internalize appropriate and 
sufficient descriptions of his states. Karl would identify himself with the Karl-as-an-other-for-others 
without internalizing such appropriate and sufficient descriptions (the third-person Karl). This 
third-person Karl would be taken over as Karl’s self (the first-person Karl). In developing his self from 
the third-person Karl thus taken over as his self, the first-person Karl would have problems with his 
behaviors and mental states. For example, he would likely experience confused or insufficiently 
differentiated mental states, expressing them in inappropriate manners. It would be too much to say that 
it is impossible for the first-person Karl to know why he has these problems and how he has come to 
have them, because it is Karl who experienced his childhood and the memory of it is retained inside 
Karl. Still, because of the memory problem discussed earlier, it would be difficult for the first-person 
Karl to know why he has these problems and how he has come to have them. It would be difficult for 
the first-person Karl to resolve these problems and modify the basis of his self if he does not know why 
he has these problems and how he has come to have them. These problems would likely persist.  
This is one example to illustrate Kant’s suggestion that the later development of one’s self continues to 
be fundamentally affected by the otherness under consideration. The picture Kant suggests is consistent 
with what empirical research demonstrates. It is shown that what kind of parental or primary 
caregivers’ feedback one receives in one’s early developmental process has profound and enduring 
effects on how one’s later self develops especially in terms of affect regulation and mentalization.11 
The later development of one’s self is also affected by otherness via unconscious imitation of others. As 
we have seen, Kant thinks that in infants the innate drive to communicate is inseparably connected with 
the innate activity of imitation and that this drive persists and affects us throughout our lives. In fact, 
Kant argues that we are also affected by imitation, including unconscious imitation, throughout our 
lives so that a huge part of our lives is formed by imitation. 
Kant (2006) states that “the human being has a natural tendency…to imitate the other person’s ways” 
(p. 142). This innate tendency is at work whether one is aware of it or not and whether one is an infant 
or an adult. Kant (2000) argues that “learning is nothing but imitation”, equating imitation with the 
capacity to learn in the broadest sense, that is, with “facility for learning (capacity [Kapazität]) as such” 
(p. 187). Under the name of “sympathetic power of imagination”, Kant (2006) discusses what is now 
called emotional or affect contagion, that is, unconscious automatic mimicry of others’ emotions and 
                                                 
11 For such effects, their neurobiological basis in the brain, and their treatment when they are 
pathological, see Bromberg (2011), Peter Fonagy et al. (2002), Ogden and Fisher (2015), and Schore 
(2012). 
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emotional expressions (p. 72). Kant (2000) says that “even if one thinks or writes for himself, and does 
not merely take in what others have thought”, it may well be that in fact one thinks “by means of 
imitation” (p. 187). While in one’s consciousness one thinks that one thinks for oneself, one may 
actually be imitating others without being aware of doing so. The same can be said of one’s values, 
tastes, desires, and so on. Indeed, Kant (2004) stresses that imitation (of others’ understanding, 
judgment, reason, taste, etc.) has such a profound and pervasive influence on us throughout our lives 
that we can never be freed from that influence (p. 5, p. 9, p. 33, p. 128, p. 131, p. 136, p. 138, p. 140, p. 
149, p. 258, pp. 316-318, p. 436, p. 474, p. 579). It turns out that we communicate our self thus formed 
and developed to one another in a chain of imitation. Kant seems to be right. Empirical research shows 
that we constantly and unconsciously imitate others (their facial expressions, vocal intonations, speech 
patterns, accents, postures, gestures, words, thoughts, emotions, etc.) in our daily lives.12 Stressing the 
significance of imitation in the development of our self and culture, McGilchrist (2009) goes so far as 
to say that “imitation is a human characteristic, and is arguably the ultimately most important human 
skill” (pp. 240-256; here p. 248). In any case, the later development of one’s self is affected by 
otherness via unconscious imitation of others. 
 
3. Conclusion 
I have reconstructed Kant’s thought on the experience of passivity, that is, the thought that before 
becoming an adult, one goes through processes that take place beyond one’s control, which form the 
basis for one’s adult self, and which affect one throughout one’s life. Kant’s thought thus recast gives us 
an insight. The insight is that passivity analyzed here persists and affects us throughout our lives even if 
we are not aware of this and even if we may not know exactly how and to what extent.  
Keeping this insight in mind, I conclude with questions that the present analysis opens up and 
implications that they have. For this, let us look at the project of the Anthropology as a whole and 
illustrate a problem that the present analysis reveals with it. As stated in the Preface to the 
Anthropology, the project is designed to investigate “what he [the human being] as a free-acting being 
makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” (Kant, 2006, p. 3). This is investigated mainly in 
the sections entitled “The character of the person” and “The character of the species” (pp. 185-201, pp. 
225-238). Here the human being is conceived of as “a being endowed with the power of practical 
reason and consciousness of freedom of his [/her] power of choice (a person [Person])” (p. 229). 
Specifically, what is investigated is the adult’s process of self-making in which one “actively” creates 
one’s self following those “practical principles” about one’s “way of life [Lebenswandel]” which one 
prescribes to oneself by one’s “own reason” (p. 185, p. 192, p. 194, p. 226, p. 230). Kant regards the 
                                                 
12 For a review on this topic, see Chartland, Maddux and Lakin (2005). People also consciously imitate 
others. I do not discuss this issue. 
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self thus created as the self in a genuine sense, calling it “character”.13 Kant argues that “the imitator 
(in moral matters) is without character” whereas one who creates one’s “character” has “originality in 
the way of thinking [Originalität der Denkungsart]” (pp. 192-193; emphasis in original).  
The present analysis reveals a problem with the project of the Anthropology. The problem is that Kant 
investigates the adult’s process of self-making without considering how one’s adult self is formed and 
affected by the experience of passivity analyzed here, despite his discussions of that experience. Based 
on our analysis, let us illustrate the problem using Kant’s words above that describe the project. One 
experiences passivity concerning “consciousness of freedom of his [/her] power of choice” as such. The 
basis of one’s adult self “actively” engaged in the process of self-making is formed by otherness in 
such a way that this otherness cannot be incorporated into one’s self-consciousness. The basis of one’s 
adult self is formed also by the activity of imitation. Imitation is the basis of “originality”. What lies at 
the basis of one’s adult self is an “imitator” of others. The same can be said of “practical principles”. 
Originally, these are principles of the conduct of others. One first learns these principles by imitating 
the conduct of others and only later prescribes them to oneself as one’s own. This is illustrated when 
Kant says in his discussion of “teaching ethics” in the Metaphysics of Morals that “for a still 
undeveloped human being [i.e., a child], imitation is the first determination of his will to accept 
maxims that he afterwards makes for himself” (Kant, 1996, p. 593).14 Lastly, one is affected by 
passivity throughout one’s life. That is to say, one’s “way of life” is affected by passivity. A full 
investigation of the adult’s process of self-making would require taking into account these factors. They 
are not, however, considered in Kant’s investigation in the Anthropology. 
Thus, the present analysis opens up questions. Given the inescapable fact of passivity examined here, in 
which sense and to what extent can we be said to be a rational, free-acting being (as described in the 
project of the Anthropology)? How do we come to terms with passivity if we are to understand 
                                                 
13 I do not go into Kant’s conception of character. For this, see Munzel (1998). 
14 “Practical principles” and “maxims” can be considered virtually the same here. Kant illustrates 
“practical principles”, which we prescribe to ourselves by our “own reason”, in terms of how we “act” 
according to them (Kant, 2006, p. 192). In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant says: “A 
maxim is the subjective principle of acting…[and] contains the practical rule determined by reason 
conformably with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and is 
therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject acts”. A maxim differs from an 
“imperative”, which is “the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the principle in 
accordance with which he ought to act” (Kant, 1996, p. 73; emphasis in original). Kant says that the 
“practical principles” at issue may sometimes be “false” and “incorrect” (Kant, 2006, p. 192). 
Presumably this is because, to use Kant’s words in the Groundwork, these are principles conformable 
to “the conditions of the subject” often including one’s “ignorance” and “inclinations”. In any case, one 
would go through a process of imitation in learning “practical principles”. 
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ourselves primarily as such a being? Does this self-understanding need to be revised? How can we 
modify the effect of passivity upon our present self? Are there other aspects than those analyzed here in 
which early human development affects us throughout our lives? If there are, what are such other 
aspects, and how are we affected? While leading us to these questions, the Anthropology does not 
tackle them. Kant’s thought reconstructed here invites us to consider these questions beyond the 
Anthropology as they have implications for social science research, our self-understanding, Kant’s 
philosophy, and non-Kantian naturalistic ethics. 
We cannot avoid considering the problem of human agency in social science research. When 
considering it, we would need to take the insight and the questions noted above into account. In our 
contemporary culture, we may tend to undervalue passivity and overvalue activity. Our attitude to our 
daily lives would then be that in which we should be active as much as possible in as many aspects of 
our lives as possible. We may be obsessed with originality. We would tend to devalue our experience to 
the extent that we feel ourselves affected by, and our activity compromised by, passivity. 
Correspondingly, we would be liable to treat one another in a devaluing way and vulnerable to such 
treatment.15 Acknowledging the insight and the questions may help us begin to reconsider, appreciate, 
and shape our everyday life in both its activity and passivity in a more balanced way. 
The insight and the questions might challenge what is conventionally done in Kant scholarship. Kant’s 
philosophy has been discussed in the context of concrete human examples and situations to consider an 
application of its principles (which, according to Kant, do not need empirical support for their 
foundation or justification). Usually, such discussions deal with examples and situations in which an 
already fully formed adult is the subject. A sufficient examination of such examples and situations 
would require taking account of how this adult subject is formed by and affected in his/her present 
thinking, emotion, and conduct by his/her experience of passivity analyzed here. Nevertheless, neither 
Kant’s thought recast here nor the questions opened up above are considered in such discussions.16 The 
                                                 
15 Cf. Salecl (2010), in which Salecl discusses the discontent and disquiet that we feel with our lives 
when we overvalue choice. Choice can be seen as representing the active side of our lives. 
16 See Allison (1990, 2001, 2004); Butts (1984); Caygill (1995); Clark (2001); Cohen (2008); 
Deligiorgi (2002); Fenves (2003); Foucault (2008); Frierson (2003, 2005); Grenberg (2013); Guyer 
(1992, 2006a, 2006b); Henrich (1992); Höffe (1994); Hunter (2002); Jacobs and Kain (2003); Keller 
(2001); Kitcher (1993); Kuehn (2001); Kukla (2006); Louden (2000, 2011); Melville (1999); Morgan 
(2000); Munzel (1998); Neiman (1994); O’Neill (1989); Powell (1990); Schmidt (2007, 2008); Shell 
(1996); Van Cleve (2003); Velkley (1989); Willson (2007); Wood (1999); and Zammito (2002). 
Kitcher (1993) finds in Kant’s discussion of Karl “nothing of philosophical interest” (p. 255, n. 23). 
Referring to the same discussion of Kant’s, in one article Schmidt says in less than four full lines that 
here Kant just reports observations about the use of “I” and the behavior of children (2007, p. 170) and 
in another article simply summarizes Kant’s observations in one short paragraph (2008, p. 464). 
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insight and the questions might challenge what has been done in such discussions.17 
As we have seen, Kant’s thought reconstructed here is consistent with what recent empirical research 
demonstrates. This has implications for naturalistic ethics and for cognitive developmental 
psychologists. Arguing that the recent findings of cognitive science show Kantian moral philosophy to 
be seriously flawed,18 Johnson (2014) develops a naturalistic ethics, an ethics compatible with and 
supported by the findings in the various fields of cognitive science. As with the Anthropology, this 
ethics too aims to investigate what “the making of a moral self” is like (Johnson, 2014, pp. 192-221). 
Both the problem of passivity examined here and the questions raised above are relevant to such an 
investigation. But Johnson, although he refers to vast literature in cognitive science, philosophy, and 
naturalistic ethics, considers neither of these. Taking into account both of these may contribute to 
reflecting further on naturalistic ethics. Also, it may help cognitive psychologists consider ethical 
implications of their research. 
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